DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 241 970 CS 504 551

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TITLE Non-Policy Debating and Affirmative Case Formats.
PUB DATE Feb 84
NOTE 20p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Western Speech Communication Association (Seattle, WA, February 18-21, 1984).
PUB TYPE Reports - Descriptive (141) -- Speeches/Conference Papers (150)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC01 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Competition; Critical Thinking; *Debate; Higher Education; Models; Persuasive Discourse; Public Speaking; *Speech Communication; *Speech Instruction
IDENTIFIERS *Debate Formats

ABSTRACT

In nonpolicy debate, the affirmative speakers must demonstrate the probable truth of a resolution. Successful formats for affirmative cases include (1) generic analysis, (2) example analysis, (3) R. J. Matlon's definitive/designative format, (4) J. Chesebro's criteria approach, and (5) "should" resolution affirmatives. In generic analysis, an approach preferred when topics are worded in the superlative, the affirmative argues that the hierarchical relationship implied by the resolution is desirable, while with example analysis, the affirmative proves the resolution probably true through representative examples of the resolution. Debaters using the Matlonian definitive/designative format establish criteria against which values are tested and then argue that their resolution satisfies those criteria. With the Chesebro's criteria approach, the affirmative presents a set of values that, while not operating within the present system, embody the theoretical requirements of the resolution. Debaters then set forth mandates to implement the specified values. In "should" resolution affirmatives, debaters define the resolution clearly and argue it or a subset of it to prove the resolution true. Successful debaters do not rely on a single format but are familiar with all. (MM)

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NON-POLICY DEBATING AND AFFIRMATIVE CASE FORMATS

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by

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INTRODUCTION

Demonstrating the truth of a resolution requires that fundamental burdens are met by an affirmative debater. These obligations are called the "prima faciae" burdens, and generally describe basic standards of proof such that after the first affirmative speech in the debate, should no subsequent speeches follow, affirmative nor negative, the critic would have sufficient reason to believe the resolution to be probably true. "By "probably true" is not meant that the proposition's truth value is eternal and unchanging, but that, in the situation at hand, the judge has good reason to assent to the proposition."[1] In non-policy debate, those "prima faciae" burdens include linkage and significance. Linkage refers to the requirement that the affirmative demonstrate that the problem is somehow related to the issue stated in the resolution. For example, the topic, "liberty is more important than law," would require that the affirmative demonstrate some benefit inherent to the hierarchy (if liberty is greater than law, justice is guaranteed) or some harm inherent to the reverse hierarchy (if law is greater than liberty, then repression is probable). Significance, on the other hand, requires the affirmative to demonstrate that the benefit or problem is important, minimally sufficient to justify the hierarchical placement.

There are, of course, no pat formats on how to write affirmative cases, but if experience is to be our guide, certain techniques have met with success.

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GENERIC ANALYSIS

This is probably the most preferred approach to debating non-policy resolutions. The affirmative merely argues that the hierarchical relationship implied by the resolution is desirable, and does so generically. The case would include a contention which would cite evidence and analysis which proves the resolution probably true. For example, the topic, "eugenics is morally unjustified," would require the affirmative employing this format to defend a single contention which would define "eugenics" and "morally unjustified," and then argue that the phenomenon, eugenics, does not meet the defining qualities of morality.

This simplified approach seems to be preferred when topics are worded in the superlative, e.g. "freedom of the speech is the most important Constitution right," and topics of comparison without a compared value, e.g. "rights to privacy are more important than any other Constitutional right," and topics of comparison with a compared value, e.g. "American education has sacrificed quality for economy." All of these approaches would require definitions of the phenomena, freedom of speech, rights to privacy, quality of American education, and the compared values, Constitutional right, and economy. In addition, the affirmative must define the term(s) which direct the hierarchy, most important, and more important. The affirmative then compares the qualities of both phenomena in the comparison and demonstrates that the value preferred in the wording of the resolution better meets the values implicit to the terms of comparison, most or more important.

In generic analysis, the values are examined implicitly. The affirmative argues the implicit superiority of the hierarchy suggested by the resolution without relating the topic to outside referents.

The benefit of generic analysis is its simplicity. The novice debater and the inexperienced critic can easily apply simple structural value systems to determine the probable truth of the resolution based upon the claims by the affirmative. Regardless of the paradigm, this approach fulfills the primary requirements of good argumentation. As an in-classroom device, generic analysis is a useful teaching tool; in competition, it offers an opportunity for limited discussion and affirmatively directed focus indispensible to the beginning debater.

While generic analysis is relatively simple for an inexperienced debater to understand and apply, it has some significant drawbacks. First, it tends to result in poor use of evidence. Debaters, especially inexperienced ones, will tend to use conclusionary evidence stripped of any referents. In other words, they will cite authorities who use the same words but mean very different things. For example, "rights to privacy" may be individual or governmental. "Eugenics" may include DNA recombinant research or genetic engineering. "American education" may mean in-classroom government-subsidized instruction or in-kind training. In generic analysis, there is a greater tendency to misuse citations, intentionally or not. Second, it tends to result in superficial analysis. Instead of examining the issues implicit to a non-policy statement, the debate will often become a banter of citations which contradict one another. The critic is left to decide the truth of the resolution based on conflicting authoritative opinions.

EXAMPLE ANALYSIS

The format of example analysis allows the affirmative to prove the resolution probably true through representative examples of the resolution.

In policy debate, the affirmative defines the resolution through an example which has become to be known as the "plan." The plan is a very imperfect device to limit discussion, but it does have certain beneficial features. It provides a very precise meaning to the terms of the resolution, establishes examples against which which claims of untopical discussion can be evaluated, and provides a backdrop against which the relevance of certain issues can be established.

Example analysis is relatively novel in non-policy debating and is based upon the view that political and legal systems express the intentions as well as the structure of the status quo. Policy grows out of philosophical systems and not the reverse. Even landmark legislation can be inextricably linked to prevailing value systems which pervaded the political institution responsible for the change. The provision of Medicaid funds for abortion services reflected a shift in reasoning by the U.S. Supreme Court liberalized by a change in its membership. The passage of the Freedom of Information Act reflects the dissatisfaction Americans felt following the Pentagon Papers controversy. The human rights foreign policy practiced by the Carter Administration represented the post-Vietnam resentment, while the aggressive foreign arms sales approach of the Reagan Administration probably identifies the weariness Americans held for falling behind the Soviets in military hardware inventories.

The affirmative in example analysis is required to present "good" examples not just reasonable ones. The example(s) should be representative of the class from which they were drawn escaping, as such, from the negative claim of hasty generalization. In policy debating, the concept of the counter-warrant, a disadvantage against a topical example of the resolution other than that originally citied by the affirmative, is used to prove that the resolution is probably undesirable when the affirmative chooses an unrepresentative example.

The reasoning is that the affirmative calls for the adoption of the resolution as an entity and not an example of it.

If the example is representative of the class from which it is drawn, then it should share many, if not all, the characteristics of the entire class.

To test whether an example is representative, the affirmative must be able to identify certain necessary elements of the proposition which are shared by the affirmative example.

For instance, the resolution "higher education has sacrificed quality for institutional survival" probably requires the affirmative to draw their examples from 1. the field of post-secondary education and 2. all of education which has been postponed or foregone due to pragmatic exigency considerations.

For "federal government censorship is justified to defend the national security of the US", would include 1. prior restraint by the national government in the District of Columbia" and 2. to protect the nationhood and its members from external agression.

When the affirmative meets these standards, they are arguably representative.

The cry of hasty generalization is not enough -- it is not an issue to be decided subjectively by the critic, it is a debtable issue and as such the initiator must introduce evaluative criteria, a decision rule. The negative and affirmative must demonstrate certain fundamental and necessary characteristics of the resolution which the affirmative has or has not met. The debate, like topicality in policy debate, occurs on the level of representativeness of the affirmative example.

In addition, the failure of the affirmative to provide a "good" example may result in the fallacy of hasty generalization when observing that a whole group have some property when observing only a small number from that group.

The second criteria of hasty generalization issued by Carney and Scheer and introduced by Paulsen and Rhodes is sample size. Perceptually, it is sample size which most often dominates a hasty generalization argument. However, size is relative. The theft of one kilogram of plutonium has much greater implcations than one hundred tons of pig iron.

Sample size in statistical sciences is discernible through the introduction of a simple F test which specifies minimal sample size necessary for significance in an experimental design.

In arguable quazi-factual subjective value statements, such objective hard computations are impossible. Size, therefore, must be determined otherwise.

Size analysis can be argued in terms of 1. quantity of actors involved and affected, 2. degree of involvement and effect for some class of actors, and 3. significance of the phenomenon under discussion versus actors. Like a scale and similar to risk analysis, large numbers of actors with minimal issue significance may balance against a small number of actors with maximal significance.

To decide hastiness by a gross count of actors ignores "breakthrough" research whereby isolated findings from a single and yet unreplicated experiment are sufficient to redirect concensus. It ignore decisions based on the gravity of an act which affects few like research funding in catastrophic diseases. It also ignores the weight given authoritative opinion in non-policy debating -- evidence in highly subjective and statistically inert.

Regardless of the size of the example, the affirmative is then able to persuasively argue that their example is "good" and, as such, is not hasty.

The cry of hasty generalization is not enough. The debate does not stop for a subjective edict from the critic; the debate merely occurs on two levels: 1. testing of the example as representative and size/significant as a

resolutional justification and 2. testing of the isues as a justification to believe the resolution probably true.

In example analysis, the affirmative argues that the resolution is best analyzed through a representative example. For example, under the "nuclear freeze is desirable" topic, the affirmative could argue that a freeze on a specific weapon or delivery systems, or their deployment was desirable. For example, under the "rights of privacy are more important than any other Constitutional right" topic, the affirmative could limit discussion to victimless crime statutes, the prior sexual history defense in rape trials, lobotomies, etc.

The affirmative, also, can offer more than one example of the resolution. Each example must be "prima faciae" and "good." For the affirmative, this offers a competitive edge since the negative must then argue against all examples of the affirmative to prove the resolution probably not true. This requires a very competent negative debater able to allocate time and arguments efficiently.

The benefits of example analysis are threefold. First, it reduces uncertainty. Examples give meaning to and take meaning from regulations which are specific in application, and intent. A court would never make a determination of guilt based on some generic plea by a disgruntled plaintiff but instead would demand to know the specific instance involved. Congress would never adopt legislation which only had an intent clause, unless of course, they remanded the intended action to some regulatory entity for rule-making. The Executive would not issue Presidential orders which grant authority to an aide without limiting his discretion notwithstanding the Watergate phenomenon. Examples are clear and specific. Second, it reduces the abuse of citations. The affirmative argues specific examples with evidence that is contextually legitimate. Third, it gives the affirmative a strategic edge by limiting the debate to well-researched and understood affirmative territory.

Example analysis can, however, become a very abused format in the hands of an overly competitive and unscrupulous affirmative debater. By selecting unrepresentative and obscure examples, the affirmative can skew the debate heavily affirmative, and be responsible for superficial debates. Fortunately, the negative has such devices as the counter-warrant and the counterjustification (hypothetical countercase) as options to discourage this practice.

MATLONIAN DEFINITIVE/DESIGNATIVE FORMAT

Matlon argues that the affirmative can prove a resolution probably true by meeting two format obligations in the affirmative case. First, he argues a definitive issue whereby the affirmative extrinsically specifies certain qualities of some universal value. Second, he argues a designative issue in the form of some pragmatic description of the resolution. By demonstrating that the designative issue meets the standards outlined in the definitive issue, he presumably proves the resolution probably true.

This approach requires the affirmative to win both issues. If the negative can defeat the criteria against which the designative is examined or the designative issue which then compares nothing to the definitive criteria, there is no "good" reason to vote for the affirmative.

However, this approach allows the affirmative to demark its own territory by well-defined criteria. As Matlon wrote in his Alta paper, value argumentation can occur on two levels: on the level of some definitive issue and on the level of some designative issues; these are two "stock issues" of sorts. He writes that " ... it is the debater's job to ... try to convince a judge to place (the value or values) high on his/her ethical system in this particular debate context." [2] On a definitive level, the debaters will establish some criteria against which the value(s) are tested, they constitute rules for decision making.

On a designative level, the debaters will offer examples of resolution which prove the the validity of the value. The opposing team, on the other hand, can argue that the definitive criteria are incorrect or insufficient, and can argue counter-examples which disprove the affirmative value against its own definitive criteria. As Matlon suggests, "(e)thical statements that cannot be universalized within the field of ethics or, at the very least within the universe of the topic, generally, cannot be accepted as moral rules. In developing "good reasons," then, it is no doubt a good idea for the values debater to attempt to make his ethical position exceptionless applying them to all cases at all times."[3]

Matlon presumed that the affirmative would define some phenomenon through criteria. If the phenomenon was desirable, the criteria which defined it would presumably also be desirable. And should the phenomenon referred to in the resolution fulfill the same criteria, that resolution would also be desirable with the resolution consequently been proven to be probably true.

Benoit in his essay on "... the theory of abstract and concrete values in political philosophy... " argues that values underlie all choices and decision making, liberals tends to argue from abstract values while conservatives tend to argue from concrete values. With liberals tending to support systemic change, it is his thesis that those which support systemic change would introduce into the model of argument non-linear, abstract, non-verbal, imagic, associational, non-order dependent codes. While conservatives who tend to support incremental change tend toward concrete codes. Benoit's work applies to Matlon's definitive/designative duotomy.

Definitive criteria dealing with liberal goals tend to be abstract while those dealing with conservative goals tend to be concrete, or definitive criteria dealing with systemic change tend to be abstract while those dealing with

incremental change tend to be concrete. Non-policy debating deals with systemic change. If values underlie all policymaking, and consequently all policy systems, then any change in a value's location on the hierarchy would subsequently result in some shift in the system. In policy debating, the changes are more incremental, involving the expenditure of funds and the provision of manpower, to resolve some ill, but a solution which is bound into the current system.

Therefore, the criteria or definitive issues which best allow for a fair examination of the designative issues would by the nature of a value resolution be abstract issues and not concrete ones. Examples will prove this clearly. If the affirmative used "democracy" as their definitive issue and isolated criteria which demarcate a democratic state. Their choice for a concrete criterion could be democracy is efficient, for every input into the economic system there is some corresponding output greater than the input in dollars and cents. Another team may choose to define democracy abstractly: democracy is freedom, the right to choose and the right not to choose. The affirmative who concretized the definitive issue will have a very difficult time convincing the judge that the criterion is inherent to democracy when other political systems can be efficient to differing degree in terms of Deutsch marks and rubles. In addition, the criterion of efficiency is not intrinsically desirable. It would justify mass extermination of non-productive populations, feudalism, etc. However, the affirmative choosing abstract definitive variable could justify the value and its position on the hierarchy by reference to an inherent and intrinsically desirable criterion with some higher probability of success. Indeed, any systemic change would be based on some near universal criterion which is not readily quantifiable, but instead would have some "delicious" ambiguity with meaning unique to each receiver.

Matlon's approach is implicit to all type of non-policy debating. However, the affirmative may choose to employ a format which perceptually is more readily analyzed. When teams use this model, critics often reject their approach as "semantic" dribble. It is, furthermore, reasonable to state that no non-policy affirmative case could be written which totally ignored Matlon's format; it is related to all other models in one way or another.

CHESEBRO'S CRITERIA APPROACH

Chesebro's criteria approach is drawn from policy debating and was a natural outgrowth from the popular comparative advantage case. Chesebro wrote that "In these criteria cases, the affirmative presents a set of values which are not operating within the present system yet embody the theoretical requirements of the resolution." [4] The plan would adopt a series of mandates which would implement the values specified.

Though criteria cases were unpopular in policy debating, they are very vogue in non-policy debating whereby the affirmative extrinsically justifies the resolution by linking the value statement in the resolution to another value or series of values that are universally good. Procedurally, the affirmative would present in an observation a series of criteria which would be followed by contentions which demonstrate that the value relationships found in the wording of the resolution meet the criteria presented in the observation.

Ideally, the criteria approach envisioned by Chesebro would involve the selection of criteria which should govern policy making, but which contemporaneously seem not to. We happen to live in an imperfect world, and occasionally our shortsightedness tends to skew policy -- the mere existence of Congressional oversight hearings and the judicial branch of government bears this out. When Carter reevaluated American foreign policy and enforced human rights

as a criteria by which U.S. military assistance should be gauged, he offered an alternate set of criteria to that then preferred -- "what's good for America is good for the world." When Congress decided to cut funds for CIA activities in Angola and Nicaragua for reasons of self-determination, they offered an alternate set of criteria to that then preferred -- U.S. security should be insured at all costs. When the Supreme Court held in **Stanley v. Georgia** that one could view pornography in the privacy of his home they also offered an alternate set of criteria to that then preferred -- group ethics. Chesebro's format for the affirmative can find many hard examples in the machinations of bureaucrats and their political turbines.

The main advantage to Chesebro's approach is that it draws the negative to debate in affirmativeland, and is particularly effective for those resolutions which are highly skewed negative. The affirmative by selecting a group of unique criteria can force the negative to consider less than popular implications of a value system, implications which are generally not even contemplated by those involved in the pre-policy determinant and the post-policy evaluative phases of policy making. Examples would include: democracy is enhanced when access to representative government is maximized for those least able to speak for themselves; this criteria forces the negative to place more importance on disadvantaged groups rather than the popular consideration of majoritarianism. Or deterrence is measured in force times intention; this criteria forces the negative to consider nuclear policy in its gross weapon counts.

There are somes drawbacks. As Chesebro explained. "Criteria affirmatives generally present a list of new criteria to be used as guidelines for effective policy decisions, but the criteria employs value terms with an extremely high level of abstraction and neither the judges nor negative team is confident of the operational meaning of the criteria. The priority of these new

criteria is seldom discussed nor are reasons offered by the affirmative for why the criteria should be employed or why alternatives are not better suited to effective policy. Negatives generally counter the affirmative criteria by offering a new set of equally abstract criteria." [5] What then occurs is a very superficial debate with two teams bickering about who has the best criteria by which to determine the truth of the resolution. It is probably wise to keep the criteria as concrete as possible to enhance clash when such a circumstance arises.

Chesebro gave us four affirmative options when confronted by a challenge on the criteria level of discussion. The affirmative may want to argue that their criteria are "(1) consistent with the value proposed or (2) that other values should be rejected, or (3) the new value should have priority, or (4) that the net gains of the new value exceed the loss of other values." [6] He suggests that first, there may be something implicit to the criteria which makes it uniquely applicable to the resolution under discussion. For example, "That American foreign policy respects human rights" would encourage criteria which addresses the plight of foreign nationals when Washington supports totalitarian regimes. The topic that "The right of the unborn is more important than that of the unwed mother" would encourage criteria which examined the characteristics of life found in the fetus. Secondly, the affirmative can support their criteria by indicting contemporary criteria. For example, the "human rights" topic criteria could include an indictment on business interests inherent to current foreign policy making. The "right to life" topic could include an indictment on promiscuity encouraged by readily accessible abortion services. This option, however, must be wed to the first option. The affirmative cannot justify their criteria by only arguing that the current criteria are bad; they must give good reasons why theirs is better. That is Chesebro's third option. Finally, the

affirmative can argue cost-benefit analysis by claiming that the increased probability of making true or good decisions by employing the affirmative criteria significantly outweighs whatever drawbacks are suffered by relinquishing competing negative criteria. This is the familiar balancing of advantages and disadvantages so common in policy debating.

The negative has similar counteroptions. They may accordingly "(1) reject the goals or subcriteria of the affirmative; (2) reject the primacy of the value or; (3) redefine the value." [7] These options are addressed in the following chapter.

Closely related to the "criteria case" is the "goal case" popularized in an article by Lewinski, Metzler and Settle. Its fundamental difference is that "in a goal case, the affirmative must prove that the status quo is inherently precluded from goal attainment." [8] Though this may sound particularly policy oriented, the "goal" approach can be very effective when debating resolutions stated in the negative. For example, "That higher education in the United States has failed to contribute to a strong America." or "That the American judicial system protects criminals." Both these topics suggest that the present system is somehow unable to meet a meaningful goal. The first intimates that the purpose of education is to insure a strong America, and an affirmative team may well argue that would involve fulfilling criteria like: economic growth and industrial productivity, God-fearing servants, etc. The second presumes that criminals are set free or treated too lightly. The affirmative may argue persuasively that one of the purposes of the judicial system is to punish social deviants, or even that punishment is an important requirement for rehabilitation of criminals. The affirmative in either resolution would present criteria which the present system has somehow failed to meet.

The "criteria" approach, on the other hand, is most effective with

resolutions stated affirmatively. By their very nature, resolutions stated in the negative inherently assume that some criteria or value has not been met. Consequently the negative effects. When, however, the resolution insists on some new standards by which to evaluate the present system, then the criteria approach which offers the opportunity to introduce new criteria seems most appropriate. The only real differences between the "criteria" and "goal" affirmative occur on that level.

"SHOULD" RESOLUTION AFFIRMATIVES

While resolutions employing the term "should" are more popular in policy debating, there is no reason whatsoever that "should" resolutions cannot be debated in the non-policy arena. Whenever "should" is used it suggests that some change is necessary to either resolve a problem or to produce some benefit which the present system seems to be inherently incapable of doing. The resolution, "That immigration and naturalization policies of the United States should be significantly altered," suggests that current policies are deficient or harmful. For example, "That comprehensive medical care should be guaranteed to all Americans" does suggest that comprehensive medical care currently is unavailable to all Americans, and the provision of health care benefits regardless of status would be desirable over the status quo.

These resolutions have become the backbone of high school NFL team debating and college NDT debating. In those settings, the affirmative defines the resolution with a plan and debates the implications in adopting the plan through reasonable legislative channels. Regarding the immigration topic above affirmatives could argue "open-door" to countries experiencing terrorism and war, or even "no" entry to certain undesirables such as criminals, or even preferred entry to certain peoples whether on the basis of nationality or race, or

whatever. A particularly competitive affirmative team could change entry policies for a single country, El Salvador or Zimbabwe. They could debate the second topic by offering medical care to special groups, Amerindians, prison inmate populations, or extend particular type of medical care, dental plans, prepaid group practice, medical research grants, etc. In policy debating the entire round rests on the capability of a specific plan to resolve some problem or produce some advantage. In many rounds, however, the critic finds himself voting for a team who does not necessarily prove the resolution true, rather he votes for the team who has written the plan which "spikes out" as many of the negative plan arguments as possible, or which is written cleverly luring negative teams into intricate webs of contradiction. Plans are highly complex things often taking up to fifty percent of the first affirmative constructive speaking time, and so intricate that it would put bills introduced onto the floors of Congress to shame for their superficiality. Plans are readily available for the critic's inspection and are often dittoed off on one or even more single spaced pages.

In non-policy debate, there are presumably no plans per se. How then can an affirmative team debate a quazi-policy resolution?

The answer is found in the affirmative definition of terms. For example, the affirmative can define "immigration and naturalization policies" as "all regulations affecting the flow of aliens into and out of the United States" and would, therefore, argue how this particular population is not currently serviced by these regulation. The affirmative indicts the entire set and by giving good examples tries to convince the critic that the resolution indicting the INS is probably true. Don't presume that the affirmative must defend every possible example of the resolution or that the affirmative must speak in grand generality. In actuality the affirmative need only prove the resolution true, and that may

not require that the resolution be true all of the time.

Another technique involves comparing values of the resolution against the antithesis of the resolution. The affirmative can argue that all Americans regardless of social status, race, etc. has some inalienable right to life and the preservation of that life again disease. They next argue that current medical care is ineffectual and does not insure their physical integrity. The negative debates this affirmative on the basis of whetner every person has some inalienable right to medical care.

Plans are not necessary to debate "should" resolutions whatsoever. "It may not always be necessary to present a plan--the principles of the proposition may be self-evident." [9] For that matter, a policy debater may learn quite a bit from the non-policy debater in this regard for instead of reading a series of mandates which set up some intricate superstructure to administer a regulation, a policy team may simply introduce their mandate by the simply phrase: "Through all Constitutional means the following regulations should be adopted with all attendant functions minimally necessary to guarantee operational integrity." This simple phrase would keep debates from deterioriating into quibbles over plan flaws, or comparing funding mechanisms. Non-policy debaters may have the right idea here. Define the resolution clearly and argue it or a good subset of it to prove the resolution true.

Most recently non-policy debaters have introduced a plan of sorts into the practice of non-policy debating. Presuming the legal systems reflect value hierarchies, the affirmative may at times find it profitable to cite an example of policy from the present system which reflects the underlying value system in non-policy resolution which suggests policy implications. For example, the resolution "federal government censorship is justified to defend national security" allows the affirmative to cite certain censorship plans in force. The

Office of Emergency Preparedness has an Office of Censorship Plan in cases of nuclear attack. The Export Control Administration regularly censors certain levels of communication and export of goods to non-friendly nations.

This approach focuses the debate on precise and definable issues and removed arguing values in non-policy resolutions in a vacuum.

CONCLUSION

If art exists in competitive debate, it does so in the affirmative case -- an eight to ten minute speech which is so persuasive and complete that by it. If it can serve as the basis for decision making. As an affirmative debater, the formats available are numerous yet hardly complete.

The subject matter determines style in creative prose, verse and dramatic literature. The resolution and the case concept will similarly determine the format. Experiment. Write different formatted versions of the same case until you discover which one works best for you. There is, also, a strong tendency for a coach or a debater to become locked-into a familiar format which is a very foolish thing to do in an activity as competitive as debate. Just as some debaters experience great success by continually and irregularly running different affirmative cases, so other clever debaters do the same with case format.

The affirmative begins the debate and lays the foundation for discussion. That obligation is substantial and he has an important responsibility to present a "good" literate and organized case. If the debate deteriorates into bickering and confusing balderdash, nine times out of ten the affirmative debater is at fault.

FOOTNOTES

1 David Zarefski, "Argument As Hypothesis-Testing." A paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, San Francisco, California, 28 December 1976: 6.

2 Ronald J. Matlon, "Propositions of Value: An Inquiry Into Issue Analysis and the Locus of Presumption." A paper presented at the Summer Conference in Argumentation, Alta, Utah, July 30 - August 2, 1981: 10.

3 Ibid.

4 James Chesebro, "Beyond the Orthodox: The Criteria Case." Journal of the American Forensic Association. 7 (1971):208.

5 Ibid., 210.

6 Ibid., 214.

7 Ibid.

8 John D. Lewinski, Bruce R. Metzler, and Peter L. Settle, "The Goal Case Affirmative: An Alternative Approach to Academic Debate." Journal of the American Forensic Association. 9 (1973):460.

9 Op. Cit., Zarefski, 7.

A paper presented at the WSCA Convention, Seattle, Washington, February 21, 1984.